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WHITEMARSH 

An Address 

DELIVERED BEFORE THE 

PENNSYLVANIA SOCIETY 

OF 

SONS OF THE REVOLUTION 

AT 

WHITEMARSH 

Montgomery County, Pennsylvania 

June 19, 1909 

BY 

CHARLES HENRY JONES 

V. 

Chairman of tiie Board of Managers 



7- Cs. 



PHILADELPHIA, 1909 






Gift 

The Society 

25Je'0S 



Mp FelloTV-memhers of the Sons of the Revolution: — 

We are assembled to-day on historic ground. All the 
region about us was trodden by soldiers of the Continental 
Army with feet so badly protected that Washington was 
obliged unsuccessfully to ofFer a reward for the best sub- 
stitute for shoes made out of raw hides. 

One hundred and thirty-two years ago the Continental 
Army pitched its tents and made its huts on the hillside 
yonder, and on Militia Hill, which lies behind us, where it 
remained for thirty-nine days — a longer period than at any 
other place in Pennsylvania, except Valley Forge. 

Chestnut Hill lay three miles away in its front, and beyond 
was the British Army under Sir William Howe (the only 
British Army in America since the surrender of Burgoyne) 
closely withdrawn, since the battle of Germantown, within 
its strong entrenchments, which extended from Kensington 
on the Delaware to the Schuylkill at Callowhill Street, and 
consisted of a succession of strong redoubts connected by 
abatis. 

It was the same Continental Army, practically under the 
same officers, that I described to you in detail upon a former 
occasion when we visited its camping ground upon the banks 
of the Neshaminy, increased by reinforcements and depleted 
by the dead and wounded it had lost at Brandywine, Paoli 
and Germantown, and by the sick who had dropped out 
because of exposure and neglect. Three months had elapsed 
since the army left its quiet camp at Neshaminy, and within 

3 



that time it had marched as far south as Wilmington, had 
suffered defeat at Brandywine, had marched as far to the 
west as the Warren Tavern, as far to the north as Potts 
Grove, and then, by easy stages down to Whitemarsh, where 
we now are. On its way here it had lost the Battle of Ger- 
mantown. The right wing reached this place by the way of 
the Skippack Road, which lies before us, and the left wing 
marched down the Morris Road a few miles yonder to the 
north. The territory within the points I have named is known 
as the seat of the Revolutionary War in Pennsylvania. 
Through this seat of war the main army marched and coun- 
termarched, and sent out detachments hither and thither for 
various purposes until the inhabitants along nearly all the 
roads that traversed it became familiar with the sight of its 
officers and men. The soldiers of the army stopped at their 
doors on their weary marches and the officers made their 
quarters in their homes. There were no bright spots in this 
campaign to lift up the spirits of these poorly clad and poorly 
fed Continentals. When they looked back over it from here 
they found nothing in the retrospect but discouragement and 
defeat. The spirit that sustained them came not from their 
environment. They were uplifted by the spirit that was 
within. In addition to all their misfortunes which were be- 
yond control, they had just cause for the dissatisfaction that 
prevailed throughout the Camp arising from the unsatisfactory 
way in which their rank was adjusted and the unsatisfactory 
treatment they received from an inefficient government. 

The transfer of the seat of war to Pennsylvania endowed 
with a deep and lasting interest the places which lie about 



us, and we, as a Society composed of the descendants of the 
soldiers of the Revolution, do well to commemorate the events 
associated with these places and keep them ever fresh in the 
minds of the people. 

The campaign of 1 777 began at Neshaminy late in August 
and ended here before the middle of December. It was one 
of the most important campaigns of the War and included 
within its scope the hard fighting at Brandywine, Paoli, Ger- 
mantown. Fort Mifflin and Fort Mercer; the skirmishes that 
took place here, at the foot of Chestnut Hill and other places 
as well as long marches under the depressing weight of de- 
feat. We remember this army in its open camp at Nesham- 
iny with their troubles before them, waiting to learn the des- 
tination of Howe's fleet, not knowing whether to move toward 
the Hudson or to the southward, harassed by nothing but 
their perplexities in those pleasant August days. We find 
them here after their terrible experiences, amid the rigors and 
discomforts of winter, dejected, but not dismayed, defiantly 
intrenched in a strong position, with a powerful, well-dis- 
ciplined, well-equipped and superior European army in their 
front. 

The story of the historical events that transpired here may 
be briefly told. 

The army arrived here November 2d, 1 777. It at once 
built a redoubt on its extreme right, on the high ground above 
the Bethlehem Road, which commanded that road. This 
redoubt is still there as the Continental soldiers built it, and 
is of supreme interest to us, though not a shot was fired at it, 
and it was not found to be necessary to fire a shot over its 



breastworks. What fighting there was in this neighborhood 
took place further to the eastward. 

The camp of the army was laid out, three miles in length, 
along the southern slope of the range of hills that runs from 
that redoubt to the eastward; the left wing lying nearly oppo- 
site Edge Hill. They threw up entrenchments in their front, 
and cut down trees, which, with their branches extending 
outward, formed a sort of improvised abatis. Their position 
was further protected by a creek known as Sandy Run, 
which ran along the foot of these hills from one end of the 
camp to the other and beyond. Washington made his head- 
quarters at the house of George Emien, near the centre of the 
army, at the foot of the hills on the inside of Sandy Run. 
Here he was visited by many distinguished men, both in the 
civil and military life of the times, and by a Committee of 
Congress. 

The army fit for duty consisted, when it arrived at White- 
marsh, of 8313 Continental troops and 2717 militia. They 
were ragged and half naked, without shoes or blankets, in 
consequence of which there was much sickness. All the sick 
were sent to improvised hospitals in their rear. They were 
without money — not having received their October or Novem- 
ber pay. They seldom had more than a day or two's pro- 
visions ahead and often not that — either of meat or bread. 

Washington watched from this camp, with keen interest, 
the magnificent struggle going on below Philadelphia to main- 
tain the defenses of the Delaware, going upon one occasion 
to the top of the Chew House in Germantown to overlook 
the situation, but owing to the doggedness of Gates in neg- 

6 



lecting to send him reinforcements from the Northern Army- 
he was not able to do for the relief of those fortifications all 
that he anxiously desired. It was while here that Washing- 
ton heard the discouraging news of the fall of Fort Mifflin and 
Fort Mercer. While here Washington was constantly an- 
noyed by the machinations of the Conway Cabal. It was 
from here that he administered his dignified and withering re- 
buke to Conway. The army had passed through this cam- 
paign with such rapidity that Washington had been without 
his baggage since the middle of September. The settlements 
about the army were filled with tories. It was here that 
General Stephen was court martialled and dismissed the 
service. Lafayette, who had held a commission as Major 
General for three months without a command commensurate 
with his rank, was becoming very much dissatisfied, and Wash- 
ington was able to show his esteem for him by giving him 
command of Stephen's Division. 

A council of war was held here on November 24th to con- 
sider the question of an attack upon the British in Philadel- 
phia, and Washington went to the west side of the Schuylkill 
to reconnoiter the enemy's works. Eleven of the more con- 
servative members of the council wisely voted against the 
advisability of such an attack and only four voted in favor of 
it. These impulsive four were Wayne, Scott, Sterling and 
Woodford. Wagons were converted into magazines to pro- 
tect the ammunition from the weather. Many of the men 
made rude huts for their shelter out of such material as 
they could find, as there were not tents enough to go round. 
With the exception of a few days late in November the 

7 



weather was stormy and very cold. During the early days 
of the camp the ground was covered with snow. 

Tardily toward the end of November, Washington's Army 
received large reinforcements from the Northern Army 
amounting to about 5500 men, including Poor's, Warner's, 
Patterson's, Leamed's and Glover's brigades, Morgan's corps 
of riflemen and Lee's, Jackson's, Webb's and Bailey's regi- 
ments. 

All detachments which had been sent out from this army 
were called in about the first of December, as information had 
reached headquarters that it was the intention of General Howe 
to make an attack upon the American camp. 

Even the men who later had been sent away with the bag- 
gage who had clothing and shoes sufficient to enable them to 
do duty were called back. 

Howe had received large reinforcements from the army 
in New York, and as early as November 27th he wrote to 
the Ministry that a forward movement against the enemy 
would immediately take place. 

Having left a small garrison behind under General Leslie, 
the whole British Army under General Howe left Philadel- 
phia at one o'clock (after midnight) on the morning of Friday, 
December 5th. The right wing under Cornwallis marched 
out the Germantown Road, and the left wing under Knyp- 
hausen marched by the Ridge Road along the Schuylkill. A 
few dragoons were in the advance of the right wing, followed 
by two battalions of light infantry commanded by Lieutenant- 
Colonel Abercrombie and Major Maitland. These dragoons 
and light infantry were attacked by a party of Continental 

8 



troops under the gallant and vigilant Captain Allen McLane 
before they reached Germantown, and he it was who re- 
ported to Washington the approach of the enemy. 

The British Army reached Chestnut Hill before daylight 
on the 5th of December. From there (stretched out before 
them) they could see the camp fires of the Continental Army, 
along the hills of Whitemarsh, and, guided by them, they 
formed their lines, built their own camp fires, and rested on 
their arms until daybreak, which at that season of the year 
did not occur until nearly seven o'clock. The pickets of the 
two armies exchanged shots continually during the night. 

The British Army came out without its tents or baggage, 
expecting, no doubt, with unwarranted assurance, to make a 
short campaign of it, and easily, as they boasted, dispose of 
their enemies. Nor did they carry with them more than two 
days' provisions, for at two o'clock on the morning of the 7th 
it was found necessary to send out to them a supply from 
Philadelphia escorted by the 40th, the 55th and the 71st 
regiments. This strong escort was deemed necessary because 
the wagon train was long, and because they had a proper ap- 
preciation of the danger to which it was exposed within the 
lines of the Continental Army. 

The alarm guns were fired from the Continental camp 
when the British camp fires appeared along the top of Chestnut 
Hill, and the Continental troops repaired to their alarm posts. 
The baggage of the Continental Army was sent to the Trappe, 
and the Pennsylvania Militia, 600 strong, under General 
James Irvine, which was posted on Militia Hill, behind us, 
was sent out to skirmish with the enemy's advance parties. 

9 



The second battalion of British light infantry was in the ad- 
vance when the head of the army reached the foot of Chestnut 
Hill. As the Pennsylvania Militia approached, a British 
company of riflemen under Lieutenant Armstrong advanced 
rapidly to the front and were immediately attacked by the 
Pennsylvania Militia. The militia succeeded in almost sur- 
rounding them, when, from his perilous position. Lieutenant 
Armstrong sounded an alarm that brought to his assistance 
the British light infantry. After this but two or three volleys 
were fired when the militia retreated precipitately with a loss 
of forty killed, wounded and prisoners. Among the wounded 
was General Irvine, their commander, who lost three fingers, 
received a severe contusion in the head and was taken a pris- 
oner to Philadelphia. The enemy lost about twelve killed 
and wounded, among the latter being Sir James Murray. 
This discrepancy in the fatalities arose, no doubt, from the 
fact that the Pennsylvania Militia were not so direct in their 
fire as the trained British soldiery. 

The British Army proceeded cautiously, after this skirmish, 
up the Bethlehem Road on the morning of the 5th, and before 
they reached Flourtown turned to the right and took a strong 
position in the woods in front of the American camp, about a 
mile and a half distant from it, along a range of hills which 
ran parallel with and were higher than those upon which the 
Continental Army was encamped. Along these hills they lay 
inactively during the remainder of the 5th and the whole of 
Saturday the 6th of December. 

General Howe having satisfied himself during that time 
that the American right was too strong to be successfully 



ID 




Stone Erected by the Sons of the Revolution to Mark the Site of the 
Redoubt at Whitemarsh. 



attacked, moved his army at one o'clock on the morning of 
Sunday the 7th, still further to the eastward along the same 
range of hills, until his right rested on the Limekiln Road 
below Edge Hill, about half a mile east of the point where 
the Church Road crosses Willow Grove Avenue. His left 
lay opposite the American centre. For the protection of this 
movement the first and second battalions of British light in- 
fantry divested themselves of their blankets and accoutrements 
and scoured the woods in front of the American line for about 
two miles, driving the Continental scouts and pickets within 
their lines. 

The British Army was formed into three lines, the first 
consisting of the first and second battalions of light infantry, 
chasseurs and rifle corps. The second of the first and second 
battalions of British grenadiers, and the seventh and twenty- 
sixth battalions of Hessian grenadiers. The third line con- 
sisted of the first and second brigades of British infantry, some 
battalions of Hessians, and the sixteenth and seventeenth regi- 
ments of light dragoons. 

The American line of battle was also composed of three 
lines; the right wing under command of General Sullivan, 
and the left wing under command of General Greene. The 
front line consisted of the Pennsylvania Militia, Smallwood's, 
the Second Maryland, Wayne's, Second Pennsylvania, Poor's, 
North Carolina, Learned's, Patterson's, Weedon's, Muhlen- 
berg's and the Maryland Militia. The second line consisted 
of Maxwell's, Conway's, Woodford's, Scott's, Huntington's 
and Varnum's. Glover's brigade (forming the reserve) made 
the third line. Morgan's rifle corps formed on the left of the 

II 



Maryland Militia, and Webb's regiment on the right of the 
Pennsylvania Militia. These corps and the militia were to 
act in detachment, and not in solid or compact bodies, and 
were to skirmish with and harass the enemy as much as pos- 
sible, taking special care to gain their flanks and rear if possi- 
ble. Bland's and Baylor's regiments of light dragoons were 
to be annexed to the right wing and by small detachments 
to watch the movements of the enemy, giving intelligence 
thereof and to see that the enemy did not gain the 
flanks of the army without their knowledge. Moylan's and 
Sheldon's regiments were to be annexed to the left wing for 
the same purposes. The horse were to draw up in the inter- 
vals between the Continental troops and the militia upon the 
right and left of each wing. The park of artillery was to 
be divided between the wings and the rear of the front line. 
All these elaborate formations were for a battle that did not 
take place because the British, who had thrown down the 
gauntlet, which the Americans took up, failed to make good 
their challenge. 

During the morning of Sunday the 7th, however. Major 
General Grey, with his brigade of light infantry of the 
guards, queen's rangers, Hessian and Anspach chasseurs, ad- 
vanced from the British left over the rolling country that 
lies between these hills, toward the American centre. About 
noon Colonel Charles Webb's second Connecticut regiment 
of the line, supported by the militia brigade of General Potter, 
was sent out from the American camp to harass this corps; 
and at the request of Washington, General John Cadwalader 
and General Joseph Reed, who were visiting at headquarters, 

12 



also went out to observe this advance of the enemy and ascer- 
tain, if possible, their plan of attack. These volunteer gen- 
erals, together with General Potter, endeavored to draw up 
the American troops in the woods, with a view to flanking 
the enemy, but their efforts were unsuccessful. The Ameri- 
cans, after a short skirmish, were obliged to retreat with the 
loss of many killed and wounded. Among them was Captain 
Amos Walbridge, who was wounded in the head, and Lieu- 
tenant John Harris, who was killed, both of the Connecticut 
Hne. General Reed made a narrow escape, having had 
his horse shot under him. 

Later in the day of the 7th, Lieutenant Colonel Aber- 
crombie at the head of the first and second battalions of 
British light infantry, chasseurs and rifle corps was sent out 
with orders to lie upon their arms as soon as they reached 
the banks of Sandy Run in front of the American camp. 
The British grenadiers marched one hundred yards in their 
rear, and the first and second British brigades, some Hes- 
sians and the sixteenth and seventeenth regiments of light 
dragoons, marched at the same distance behind the grenadiers. 
This more formidable movement naturally gave rise to the 
impression within the American camp that an attack upon 
their works by the British Army was imminent. A scatter- 
ing fire had been kept up by Morgan's riflemen as a skirmishing 
party during the day. When this forward movement of the 
British Army began, and an attack was anticipated, Morgan, 
with his rifle corps, was ordered to move forward and attack 
their advanced and flanking parties. Similar orders were 
given to Colonel Mordecai Gist, who commanded about two 

13 



hundred Maryland Militia. At first the British advance broke 
and fled in disorder under the vigorous fire of Morgan's men. 
The British, how^ever, were soon reinforced by a column of 
infantry and rallied. The American forces were outnum- 
bered two to one. The Maryland Militia broke and ran, 
having sustained a loss of sixteen or seventeen men killed 
and wounded. The whole British fire was then concentrated 
upon Morgan's corps, threatening their flank, and they were 
forced to retreat. 

This move of the British forces turned out, however, to be 
but a feint. The Continentals were not in the least intimidated 
by it, and as it looked very dangerous up there to the British 
from their insecure position behind Sandy Run, they did not 
remain long. 

The next and last aggressive move in the military opera- 
tions at Whitemarsh was made by the Americans. Toward 
sunset on the 7th, after Grey's detachment had rejoined the 
main army, after, indeed, the British had given it up, Mor- 
gan's riflemen, reinforced by five chosen men from each regi- 
ment in Vamum's and Huntington's brigades, advanced and 
took a strong position on elevated ground near Edge Hill. 
They had with them cannon that had been brought down 
from the Northern Army, where they had helped to bring 
about the surrender of Burgoyne. A hot fire was opened 
upon the British right by the Americans. They were im- 
mediately and vigorously attacked by Lord Cornwallis from 
his right wing, with the first battalion of light infantry, sup- 
ported by the thirty-third regiment, and a hot fight ensued, 
which was sustained for some time with great resolution. 

14 



Finally Morgan and his men were repulsed with considerable 
loss, amounting to twenty-seven killed and wounded. Among 
the former was Major Morris, of Morgan's corps, a brave and 
gallant officer, who was held in high esteem by the Marquis 
Lafayette, who made provision for his family. Morgan suc- 
ceeded, however, in bringing his men off in order, taking his 
cannon with him. 

The British stated their losses at Whitemarsh to be as 
follows: one lieutenant, three sergeants, twenty-four rank and 
file killed; three lieutenants, four sergeants, fifty-seven rank 
and file wounded; thirty-three rank and file missing. 

The British had found the centre and left of the American 
camp as strong and impregnable as they had found the right. 
They therefore held a council of general officers, in front of 
the British lines, at which "it was judged prudent to desist 
from the intended attack." Thereupon the whole British 
Army fell back on the night of Sunday the 7th, lighted their 
camp fires, and laid down in their humiliation to rest. 

Prudence is not at best a good military word. It is not 
descriptive of the qualities that accomplish great military deeds, 
nor of the qualities one would expect to find in an aggressive 
standing army that marched out a few miles into the country, 
with great martial display, against an army of rebels it intended 
to disperse. If prudence had any proper place in such an 
army it would seem to have been within the comfortable se- 
curity of its Philadelphia quarters, where courage was not 
required, and not out here after the army had met its enemy, 
at the end of its march, face to face. This was not the place 
for prudence where the situation it had made required all the 

15 



courage this standing army could command. But it seems to 
have been otherwise with this fine British Army when it was 
confronted by the bold attitude of its Continental enemies in 
the hills of Whitemarsh. Whatever courage this gallant army 
may have had in Philadelphia, or had brought out with it, 
was exchanged for prudence after it had realized upon this 
ground the real work it had to do. 

All this firing on that Sunday at Whitemarsh was listened 
to in terror by the inmates of the quiet homes of this remote 
countryside. 

During these military movements at Whitemarsh, which 
lasted for nearly four days, the men of both armies slept on 
their arms, and in their boots and clothes. Each army kept 
its pickets constantly out to watch the movements of the other. 
Light skirmishing was constantly going on, and firing was 
kept up between the pickets during the night. The weather 
was extremely cold. 

Those were strained and active days at Whitemarsh. The 
struggle for the independence of the colonies was concentrated 
here in those four days. The armed forces involved in that 
struggle were here. It was one of the few places in the his- 
tory of the war where the two main armies met face to face, 
certainly with hostile intent so far as the British were con- 
cerned. The Americans had reason to believe that that intent 
would be carried out, and they were not afraid of it. It is 
for the British historian to explain why, instead of the few 
skirmishes I have mentioned, there did not occur here one of 
the notable battles of the war. 

You will have noticed that while we speak of this his- 

i6 



torical event in the War of the Revolution as "Whitemarsh," 
only the right of the army was in the township of that name. 
Washington's headquarters, the centre and left of the army, 
and the skirmishes between the troops which took place on 
Sunday, were to the eastward, in the townships of Upper 
Dublin, Springfield and Cheltenham, and not near the Bethle- 
hem Road. 

The area over which the fighting was done was about a 
mile and a half square. You can form some idea of the 
scene of the skirmishes between those two armies if you 
will walk along the Church Road from St. Thomas' Church 
to the point where that road crosses Willow Grove Avenue. 

The rear guard of the British Army, under command of 
Lord Cornwallis, quitted Edge Hill about four o'clock on 
the afternoon of the 8th, and Major General Grey, with the 
rest of the British Army, retired from his post about the same 
time. 

These troops marched back by the Limekiln and the Old 
York Roads burning, pillaging and destroying as they went, 
venting upon the innocent and defenceless the wrath of their 
mortification and disappointment, and seeking in vengeance 
that which they had failed to achieve in valor. 

The whole British Army was back within its fortifications 
in Philadelphia at nine o'clock that night. 

This was the second time General Howe had cautiously 
reconnoitered the position of Washington's Army, strongly 
entrenched on high ground in his front. He had stormed the 
entrenchments at Bunker Hill, and had seen his troops driven 
back again and again with terrible slaughter. Once after 

17 



that, when the plan of his campaign lay across New Jersey in 
the early part of this year of 1 777, with the capture of Phila- 
delphia as his object, he paused before Washington's Army in 
the hills at Middlebrook with his thoughts full of his terrible 
experiences at Bunker Hill, and rather than take the conse- 
quences of an attack he changed his plan of campaign and 
approached Philadelphia by the circuitous way of the Chesa- 
peake. When he had brought his reinforced army out of 
Philadelphia to Whitemarsh, with the intention, as he had an- 
nounced to the Ministry, of giving battle to the Continental 
Army and found that army in the hills before us, the same 
dread came again into his mind, and after remaining in the 
front of Washington's Army for the greater part of four days 
he returned in humiliation to Philadelphia. His army came 
out with great pomp, like that army in Flanders, and marched 
back again amid the derision of the whole population of 
Philadelphia. 

Andre, that close observer of the personnel of the Con- 
tinental Army, was there, and Comwallis, and the kindly and 
honest Knyphausen with his strong and predatory Hessians; 
Grey, who had surprised Wayne's unfortified camp at Paoli, 
and all the array of the British Army were there to witness 
this fine spectacle of these ragged Continentals whom they had 
twice defeated during the campaign in open battle, standing 
defiantly in their entrenchments, not budging an inch, waiting 
patiently to hurl them back if they should have the courage to 
attack them. 

TTie Continental Army was not well disciplined at that 
time. It was chiefly made up of young men who had been 

i8 



soldiers for only a short time. There were no veterans in it. 
All the discipline the army ever had was acquired afterwards 
at Valley Forge. 

The British did not come out with the dash one might have 
expected from so fine an army. On the contrary, their move- 
ments were cautious, hesitating— almost timid. They took a 
strong position in the hills, at a safe distance, where they 
remained for nearly two days without doing anything, and 
then moved on, still seeking the security of the hills, and after 
two or three skirmishes in which, in every instance, the Ameri- 
cans were the attacking party, they went away, having accom- 
plished nothing. It may be said that the Americans were too 
strongly entrenched. Their entrenchments hardly compen- 
sated for the want of the many things they were without, and 
with which the British Army was so plentifully supplied. 
They did not balance the account between them. The two 
armies would have been greatly unequal if the fortifications 
had been taken away. It would have been folly to have 
given them up— to have come out of them to accommodate 
their enemies by fighting them on unequal terms in the open 
field. Yet those, it seems, were the only terms upon which the 
British Army would fight. The result of the military m,ove- 
ment at Whitemarsh cannot fairly be called a drawn battle. 
It was a substantial victory for the Americans. 

We wonder, as we contemplate it, and study its details, 
how it was possible. Both armies, with the exception of the 
Hessians were of the same great Anglo-Saxon race, but the 
British forces had everything, and the poor Continentals had 
almost nothing. The British were comfortably housed, well 



19 



fed, well armed, well trained and disciplined, well clothed, 
well paid, superior in numbers, successful. The Continental 
soldiers were in want of all these absolute essentials of a vic- 
torious army. In addition to their struggles with the enemy 
their lives were spent in one continual struggle with want and 
suffering, in situations that were almost unbearable. If we 
were to place two such armies as these in the balance, under 
ordinary circumstances, the result v/ould not be doubt- 
ful. The disparity between them would seem to justify 
the arrogance of the British Army. It is necessary to seek 
further for the result as it actually turned out to be. There 
we find the solution. The one was made up of the crea- 
tures of an unjust, tyrannical, oppressive power, with its 
cruel, militar3/ hirelings. The other was composed of a band 
of patriots out here poorly sheltered, in these bleak hills, fight- 
ing for the preservation of its liberties, its honor, its homes and 
its firesides, with a man at its head whom an English historian 
has said "was the noblest figure that ever stood in the forefront 
of a nation's life." 

The campaign of 1 777 was over, and it became necessary 
to provide winter quarters for the troops. So on the 1 1 th of 
December the camp at \X/liitemarsh was broken and the Con- 
tinental Army took up its sad, dreary march along this Skip- 
pack road that runs in front of us on their way to build their 
huts and endure their sufferings in the bleak hills of Valley 
Forge. 

The roads were frozen hard, and in the words of Washing- 
ton, "You might have tracked the army from Whitemarsh to 
Valley Forge by the blood of their feet." 

20 



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